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S U M M A R Y
Background: Hospitalized neonates are vulnerable to infection, with pathogen exposures occurring in
utero, intrapartum, and postnatally. African neonatal units are at high risk of outbreaks owing to
overcrowding, understafﬁng, and shared equipment.
Methods: Neonatal outbreaks attended by the paediatric infectious diseases and infection prevention (IP)
teams at Tygerberg Children’s Hospital, Cape Town (May 1, 2008 to April 30, 2016) are described,
pathogens, outbreak size, mortality, source, and outbreak control measures. Neonatal outbreaks reported
from Africa (January 1, 1996 to January 1, 2016) were reviewed to contextualize the authors’ experience
within the published literature from the region.
Results: Thirteen outbreaks affecting 148 babies (11 deaths; 7% mortality) over an 8-year period were
documented, with pathogens including rotavirus, inﬂuenza virus, measles virus, and multidrug-resistant
bacteria (Serratia marcescens,Acinetobacter baumannii, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, and
vancomycin-resistant enterococci). Although the infection source was seldom identiﬁed, most outbreaks
were associated with breaches in IP practices. Stringent transmission-based precautions, staff/parent
education, and changes to clinical practices contained the outbreaks. From the African neonatal
literature, 20 outbreaks affecting 524 babies (177 deaths; 34% mortality) were identiﬁed; 50% of
outbreaks were caused by extended-spectrum b-lactamase-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae.
Conclusions: Outbreaks in hospitalized African neonates are frequent but under-reported, with high
mortality and a predominance of Gram-negative bacteria. Breaches in IP practice are commonly
implicated, with the outbreak source conﬁrmed in less than 50% of cases. Programmes to improve IP
practice and address antimicrobial resistance in African neonatal units are urgently required.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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Hospitalized neonates are a vulnerable population owing to
immature immunity and frequent infectious disease exposures
through contact with healthcare staff, parents, other patients,
equipment, and the hospital environment. Exposure events may
lead to microbial colonization or infection with severe morbidity
and mortality, as well as nosocomial outbreaks. Outbreaks in
neonatal units (NNUs) of high-income countries occur at a rate of
10 per year.1 The frequency of outbreaks in the NNUs of low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs) is unknown, but is likely to be far* Corresponding author. Fax: +27 21 938 9138.
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).higher owing to overcrowding, understafﬁng, and the sharing and
reuse of equipment.2 Despite these risk factors, published outbreak
reports from African NNUs are infrequent and hindered by limited
microbiology laboratory access and an absence of healthcare-
associated infection (HAI) surveillance programmes and infection
prevention (IP) resources.2
Point prevalence studies in high-income countries report
healthcare-associated neonatal bloodstream infection (HA-BSI)
as the most frequent infection type affecting hospitalized neo-
nates,3 although viral respiratory and gastrointestinal infections
are also encountered. Given the high rates of HA-BSI reported from
some African settings,4–6 frequent outbreaks of nosocomial
bacterial infection could be expected in African NNUs. The limited
African neonatal HA-BSI descriptions reﬂect a predominance
of Gram-negative pathogens and substantial antimicrobialciety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
80 A. Dramowski et al. / International Journal of Infectious Diseases 57 (2017) 79–85resistance.4–6 A recent systematic review of 30 neonatal outbreaks
(2005–2015), identiﬁed Klebsiella pneumoniae (33%), Serratia
marcescens (20%), and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) (20%) as the most common pathogens.7 The mean
outbreak duration was 10 months and the outbreak source was
identiﬁed in 17/30 cases (57%): neonates transferred-in from other
facilities (n = 6), contaminated ventilator equipment (n = 5), health-
care workers (n = 4), and colonized mothers (n = 2). The lack of
resources for outbreak investigation (including laboratory services
and molecular testing), hampers efforts to identify outbreak
frequency and source in African NNUs.7
Reported NNU outbreak mortality rates are high, with the risk
of death inversely proportional to the country income level (9–
70%).7 The highest mortality rates are documented among
neonates with laboratory-conﬁrmed Gram-negative and fungal
BSI pathogens.4,6,7 A lack of neonatal intensive care units (NICUs)
and limited access to appropriate treatment for antimicrobial-
resistant infections contribute to increased mortality in LMIC NNU
outbreaks.
This article describes the Tygerberg Children’s Hospital
experience with the detection, investigation, and control of
outbreaks in the NNU since 2008, in the context of published
outbreak reports from other African NNUs over the last two
decades.
Methods
Study setting
Tygerberg Children’s Hospital in Cape Town, South Africa is a
124-bed neonatal referral centre located within a 1384-bed
tertiary government hospital. The NNU provides medical and
surgical care for sick and/or low birth weight (LBW, <2500 g)
neonates, with prematurity, perinatal asphyxia, and neonatal
sepsis being the predominant reasons for admission. The NNU
consists of an eight-bed NICU (combined surgical and medical), a
four-bed high-care, two high-care wards, one low-care ward, and a
kangaroo mother care unit. Bed occupancy rates in the NNU range
from 83% to 138%, with a high demand for NICU beds. The hospital
performs around 8000 neonatal deliveries annually, with a LBW
rate of 39%. Mothers with complicated pregnancies are referred in
from the surrounding socioeconomically deprived communities.8
In the Western Cape Province, antenatal HIV prevalence
increased between 2009 and 2013, from 16.1% to 16.9% (vs.
29.5% nationally).9 Combination antiretroviral therapy (cART) has
been available since 2004, with universal cART in pregnancy
(irrespective of CD4 count) introduced from 2013. Between
2009 and 2011, a national prevention of mother-to-child HIV
infection transmission (PMTCT) programme achieved a reduction
in the Western Cape Province perinatal HIV transmission rate from
3.6% to 1.4%.8,10
Study period and method
Data on NNU outbreaks investigated by the infection
prevention service and/or the paediatric infectious diseases
team between May 1, 2008 and April 30, 2016 were collected
prospectively. An outbreak was deﬁned as any infectious
disease (ID) cluster affecting two or more babies with the
same pathogen within 7 days (isolated from sterile sites, with
the same antibiogram for bacterial pathogens), or isolation of a
single unusual or important pathogen, e.g., measles, Pseudomonas
spp.11 For each outbreak, the pathogen, NNU ward/s affected,
number of cases and case fatality rate, the presumed or known
source, and the IP measures instituted for outbreak control were
documented.Investigation for suspected neonatal sepsis
Sick neonates with any clinical, radiological, and/or laboratory
features suggesting infection undergo at least one blood culture
with/without accompanying cerebrospinal ﬂuid and urine culture
specimens, at the discretion of the attending clinicians. Symptoms
and signs that trigger investigation for sepsis include lethargy,
apnoea, need for increased respiratory support, poor feeding,
temperature instability, abdominal distension, and raised white
cell count or C-reactive protein, among others. Given the high
prevalence of extended-spectrum b-lactamase (ESBL)-producing
Enterobacteriaceae at the study institution, the empirical treatment
of hospital-acquired infection usually includes meropenem.
Vancomycin is added if MRSA is considered a likely pathogen,
e.g., with suspected central line or soft tissue infection. Fluconazole
prophylaxis is not routinely used. Investigation for potential viral
pathogens is undertaken based on clinical presentation, e.g.,
gastroenteritis (rotavirus and adenovirus) and respiratory tract
infection (respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), adenovirus, human
rhinovirus, parainﬂuenza virus 1/2/3, inﬂuenza virus A/B, and
human metapneumovirus) using rapid assays, ELISA, or PCR panel
testing.
Outbreak surveillance, investigation, and management
The hospital has an on-site unit for infection prevention and
control (UIPC) that conducts laboratory surveillance for selected
bacterial ‘alert’ pathogens: K. pneumoniae, MRSA, Enterobacter
cloacae, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, S. marcescens, and Acinetobacter
baumannii). Clinician reports of infection clusters are also an
important trigger for outbreak investigation. Four IP nurse
practitioners are employed (ratio 1:350 patients), with one
dedicated to the neonatal, paediatric, and maternity service. Most
infection clusters and outbreak alerts are initially investigated by
line-listing of affected patients and a review of IP practices on the
NNU. The detection of additional related cases results in an
outbreak being ofﬁcially declared with the assembly of an outbreak
team, institution of IP measures based on the suspected source and
route of transmission, and further epidemiological investigations
where necessary. Institutional changes that may have inﬂuenced
NNU infection rates and outbreak frequency include the installa-
tion of automated alcohol hand-rub dispensers (in 2013) and the
introduction of a central line-associated BSI (CLABSI) programme
in the NICU (in 2012). Other than increasing admission volumes
and ongoing staff shortages, there were no signiﬁcant changes in
patient proﬁle or physician practices during the study period.
Literature search terms
PubMed, Scopus, and the online outbreak database http://
www.outbreak-database.com were searched using the terms
“neonate”, “Africa”, “nosocomial”, “healthcare-associated infec-
tion”, and “outbreaks” for English-language papers published from
January 1, 1996 to January 1, 2016. Each publication or outbreak
database record was reviewed to extract the following information
(when available): year of outbreak, country, neonatal setting,
pathogen, number of clinical cases, deaths reported, presumed
source or factors implicated in the evolution of the outbreak, and IP
measures implemented for outbreak control.
Results
Over the 8 years, Tygerberg Children’s Hospital NNU experi-
enced 13 outbreaks affecting 148 babies with 11 deaths (7%
mortality) (Table 1). Multidrug-resistant bacteria were the most
frequent pathogens, followed by outbreaks of viral diseases
Table 1
Outbreaks affecting the Tygerberg Hospital neonatal unit (May 1, 2008 to April 30, 2016).
Outbreak
year/s
Setting Pathogen Casesa
(n)
Deaths
(n)
Presumed or conﬁrmed outbreak
source
IP measures for outbreak control
2008 NNU Rotavirus 58 0 Presumed introduction by an
infected mother or healthcare
worker
HH, CP, DP, temporary WC, VR, opening of additional NICU space
for patient isolation, cohort isolation in incubators, careful
disposal of baby nappies, enhanced environmental and equipment
cleaning, education of staff and parents, daily screening of mothers
for symptoms of gastroenteritis (6 identiﬁed)
2009 NNU H1N1 inﬂuenza
virus
5 1 Presumed introduction by an
infected mother or healthcare
worker
HH, DP, cohort isolation, education of staff and parents, VR,
exclusion of symptomatic staff members
2010 Wards Rotavirus 16 0 Presumed introduction by an
infected mother or healthcare
worker
CP, DP, HH, VR, no WC, cohort isolation in incubators, enhanced
environmental cleaning, attention to handling of nappies, staff and
parent education
2010 Ward Measles virus
(congenital)
1 0 Measles-infected mother during a
country-wide measles outbreak
AP, cohort isolation of case and ‘contacts’ in incubators, designated
stafﬁng to the affected cubicle, immunoglobulin to exposed
babies, measles vaccine to non-immune adults
2012 NNU Serratia marcescens 12 4 Reused and inadequately
decontaminated ventilator tubing
The practice of reusing ventilator tubing was stopped, hospital
management approved ﬁnancial expenditure for purchasing new
tubing, a faulty washer-disinfector was condemned and replaced,
sterile services staff were retrained on disinfection methods
2012–13 NNU MRSA 24 0 No source identiﬁed, ascribed to
non-compliance with basic IP
measures
CP, HH, staff education, MRSA decolonization protocol for
colonized and infected staff and neonates (chlorhexidine
gluconate body washes + mupirocin intranasal ointment  7 days),
enhanced environmental cleaning
2013 NNU MRSA 3 0 No source identiﬁed CP, HH, staff education, cohort isolation, MRSA decolonization of
cases and ‘contacts’ in the same cubicles
2013 NICU VRE 2 0 No source identiﬁed CP, HH, cohort isolation, movement of neonates within the
affected wards was limited, enhanced environmental cleaning,
staff education
2014 NNU MRSA 4 0 No source identiﬁed, ascribed to
non-compliance with basic IP
measures
CP, HH, VR, staff education, cohort isolation, partial WC (affected
cubicles were closed to new admissions), MRSA decolonization,
enhanced environmental cleaning
2014 NICU VRE 1 0 No source identiﬁed CP, HH, cohort isolation, temporary WC of the affected NICU
cubicle, enhanced environmental cleaning
2014 NICU Acinetobacter
baumannii
4 2 No source identiﬁed CP, HH, cohort isolation, aseptic technique for insertion and
maintenance of indwelling devices, enhanced environmental and
equipment cleaning
2015 NNU MRSA 4 0 No source identiﬁed CP, HH, MRSA decolonization, cohort isolation, enhanced
environmental cleaning
2015 NNU Serratia marcescens 10 4 No source identiﬁed CP, HH, introduced eye care protocols, emphasized aseptic
technique for procedures, new cleaning protocols for shared
equipment, enhanced frequency of environmental cleaning
AP, airborne precautions; CP, contact precautions; DP, droplet precautions; ESBL, extended-spectrum b-lactamase producer; HH, intensiﬁed hand hygiene; IP, infection
prevention; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; NICU, neonatal intensive care unit; NNU, neonatal unit; VR, visitor restriction; VRE, vancomycin-resistant
Enterococcus; WC, ward closure.
a Cases = infected neonates (excludes colonized babies).
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Two separate rotavirus outbreaks (involving 58 and 16 neonates,
respectively) occurred in 2008 and 2010, affecting the neonatal
wards and the NICU. The outbreak was investigated using line-
listing, Gantt charts, weekly epidemiological curves, and submis-
sion of stool rotavirus enzyme immunosorbent rapid assays from
symptomatic neonates and mothers. Containment measures in the
ﬁrst outbreak included temporary ward closures, prevention of
transfers between wards, and cohort isolation of neonates (in
incubators) on contact and droplet precautions. Mothers and staff
were educated on the need for compliance with hand hygiene,
precautions, and careful disposal of baby nappies, and daily
symptom screening of mothers for gastroenteritis identiﬁed six
incident cases of maternal transmission (conﬁrmed on stool
enzyme immunoassay (EIA)). Rotavirus ‘exposed’ babies (in the
same room as infected babies) were screened by EIA if
symptomatic and observed for at least 72 h before transfer out.
The second outbreak was far smaller and more rapidly controlled
(in 6 vs. 12 weeks) without any ward closures, owing to staff
familiarity and better compliance with the rotavirus management
protocol established in the 2008 outbreak.
The 2009 H1N1 inﬂuenza pandemic infected approximately
12 000 South Africans with 91 reported deaths.12 Pregnant women
were especially severely affected, with the ICU capacity to ventilatecritically ill pregnant women at Tygerberg Hospital rapidly
exceeded.13 Nosocomial transmission of H1N1 inﬂuenza was
conﬁrmed in ﬁve neonates (three mothers and one healthcare
worker tested positive for H1N1), with a further four ‘exposed’
babies. The ﬁve infected babies had a median hospital stay of
20 days at the time of laboratory testing, with a median gestational
age of 28 weeks and weight of 1130 g; all were treated with
oseltamivir and required NICU admission. One premature baby
died from necrotizing enterocolitis (NEC) 3 days after completion
of oseltamivir therapy.14 Droplet precautions, cough etiquette,
hand hygiene compliance, cohort isolation of infected/exposed
babies, visitor restriction, and exclusion of symptomatic staff
members was instituted. The outbreak highlighted a shortage of
patient isolation facilities, particularly in the NICU, and reinforced
the importance of annual staff inﬂuenza vaccination.
During a country-wide measles outbreak in 2009/2010, with
over 30 000 conﬁrmed cases nationally, a case of congenital
measles was identiﬁed on a neonatal ward. A 33-week gestation
neonate developed a maculopapular rash on day 4 of life. The
history of maternal illness had not been available at the time and a
differential diagnosis of enteroviral infection, phototherapy rash,
and congenital measles was considered. Urine and a throat swab
were positive for measles on PCR; subsequently measles serology
was IgM-positive for the mother and baby. Immediate IP measures
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designated stafﬁng to the affected neonatal cubicle. Immunoglob-
ulin (Intragam) was given to exposed babies and measles vaccine
was provided to non-immune healthcare workers and parents.
Of the nine bacterial outbreaks including S. marcescens (n = 2), A.
baumannii (n = 1), MRSA (n = 4), and vancomycin-resistant Entero-
coccus faecium (VRE; n = 2), only one had deﬁnitive identiﬁcation of
the outbreak source. An S. marcescens outbreak that affected 12
premature neonates (with four deaths) between July and October
2012 was ascribed to the reuse and inadequate reprocessing of
ventilator tubing. The outbreak investigation included rapid case
identiﬁcation with line-listing (revealing that 11/12 cases had been
ventilated) and cultures of potential sources (used and re-
processed, re-packaged ‘clean’ ventilator circuits). Clinical isolates
and S. marcescens isolated from ventilator tubing were genotyped
using pulsed-ﬁeld gel electrophoresis (PFGE) identifying a single
major clone. Transition to single-use ventilator circuits, heightened
hand hygiene compliance, and enhanced environmental cleaning
terminated the outbreak.
The ﬁrst NNU outbreaks of VRE occurred in 2013 and 2014. VRE
was isolated from two NICU patients (from a tissue specimen after
surgery for NEC in one case and from blood culture in the other).
Two further NICU patients grew VRE from catheter tips but not
from peripheral blood cultures. The outbreak measures imple-
mented included the formation of an outbreak team, screening of
patients in the NICU, contact precautions and cohort isolation of
cases and colonized patients, enhanced environmental cleaning,
limiting of patient transfers, and staff/parent education with
emphasis on hand hygiene. Targeted active screening for VRE
colonization was initially conducted on 19 infants (16% carriage
prevalence) and a month later on 12 infants (67% carriage),
including ﬁve initially VRE screen-negative neonates who became
newly colonized, suggesting a breakdown in transmission-based
precautions. One infected baby remained VRE colonized for
9 months after the outbreak. None of the environmental screening
swabs (n = 14) cultured VRE. The vanA gene was detected in all
clinical isolates and PFGE analysis distinguished nine pulsotypes
with one predominant clone. In 2014, VRE was re-introduced into
the NICU through transfer-in of a premature infant with NEC and
ileal perforation from another hospital. Four contacts (babies in the
same ICU room) were screened (all negative) and kept on strict
contact precautions; the affected ICU cubicle was closed to new
admissions. Isolation precautions were quickly and successfully
implemented given staff familiarity with the IP measures used
during the previous outbreak.
Four outbreaks of MRSA occurred between 2012 and 2015,
affecting 24 neonates in 2012/13 and 11 babies in the subsequent
three outbreaks, with no deaths. The 2012/13 outbreak included
MRSA BSI (n = 13), conjunctivitis, and skin and soft tissue
infections, which occurred over a 16-week period with ongoing
MRSA colonization between clusters. Screening identiﬁed MRSA
carriage in 16/140 babies in the neonatal unit (11%). Staff screening
was performed from outbreak week 8 because of ongoing MRSA
transmission, with a 1% positivity rate (2/208). Staff screening was
very unpopular, labour-intensive, and costly, with a low yield.
Mothers were not screened for MRSA carriage (largely owing to
cost implications and the lower risk of transmission, since the
mothers only cared for their own babies and were discouraged
from touching other babies). IP measures implemented included
contact precautions, staff education, and MRSA decolonization of
infected/colonized neonates and staff with chlorhexidine gluco-
nate body washes and mupirocin intranasal ointment for 7 days.
The pharmacy staff were particularly concerned about topical use
of chlorhexidine gluconate in neonates (particularly in LBW
babies). As a compromise, daily washes with 0.25% chlorhexidine
gluconate were used, with no adverse events reported among the24 infected and 16 colonized babies. In subsequent MRSA
outbreaks, early identiﬁcation of cases and prompt implementa-
tion of isolation measures helped to restrict the size of the
outbreaks.
In 2015, four neonates in the NICU developed A. baumannii HA-
BSI (two babies died). The outbreak investigation utilized line-
listing and observation of clinical practices in the NICU, noting
severe shortages in clinical and support staff preceding the
outbreak. IP measures included contact precautions, hand hygiene,
cohort isolation, aseptic technique for insertion and maintenance
of indwelling devices, and enhanced environmental and equip-
ment cleaning. Early identiﬁcation of the outbreak and immediate
implementation of strict contact precautions helped to contain the
outbreak, together with improved stafﬁng allocation in the NICU.
Table 2 lists the lessons learned in investigation and control
during the 8 years of experience managing outbreaks in an NNU in
a middle-income country.
Twenty published outbreak reports from African NNUs over the
last two decades were identiﬁed, with the majority from Sub-
Saharan Africa (n = 16), including South Africa (n = 12) (Table 3).15–
33 Very few of these published reports included an outbreak
deﬁnition, but those that did usually cited an outbreak as a single
pathogen affecting two or more patients with a temporal and
spatial link (between 7 and 10 days, occurring on the same ward or
unit). One-third of reports described outbreaks restricted to NICU
settings. Outbreak pathogens were predominantly bacterial, with
high rates of antimicrobial resistance. ESBL-producing K. pneumo-
niae was the most common outbreak isolate (n = 10), followed by
multidrug-resistant A. baumannii (n = 3). Twenty percent of out-
breaks (4/20) were associated with the introduction of a viral
pathogen into the NNU from the community, including rotavirus,
norovirus, RSV, and inﬂuenza virus. The 20 outbreaks affected
524 babies resulting in 177 deaths (34% case fatality rate), although
three studies did not report the number of neonatal deaths. The
outbreak source was identiﬁed in 50% of cases: infusates (glucose,
intravenous ﬂuids, parenteral nutrition) (n = 5), healthcare worker
hands (n = 4), the environment (mattresses, radiant warmers,
suction catheters and bottles, milk buckets) (n = 2), vectors
(cockroaches) (n = 1), and other patients (RSV) (n = 1); some
outbreaks involved multiple sources of infection. Although some
publications did not report on the methods used to achieve
outbreak control, commonly used measures included enhanced
hand hygiene, environmental cleaning, ward closure, cohort
isolation, and the introduction of aseptic handling of intravenous
infusions.
Discussion
Given the reported frequency of NNU outbreaks in high-
resource settings, it can be concluded that NNU outbreaks in Africa
are likely grossly under-identiﬁed and under-reported, even at the
present study institution. Using the expected annual rate of 10
outbreaks per NNU,1 at least 80 outbreaks at Tygerberg Hospital
should have been identiﬁed for the study period. It is likely,
therefore, that even in this relatively well-resourced setting (with
access to laboratory investigations, IP and ID services), NNU
outbreaks are missed or undocumented.
In the two outbreaks in which strain-typing was utilized
(S. marcescens (2012) and VRE (2013)), the use of expanded
laboratory testing was instrumental in linking additional cases
retrospectively and identifying the outbreak source. This institu-
tion’s high HA-BSI rate (particularly for ‘endemic’ K. pneumoniae
BSI) suggests ongoing bacterial transmission with small infection
clusters where epidemiological relatedness is not immediately
apparent (in the absence of molecular typing). In further support of
this hypothesis is the fact that not a single K. pneumoniae outbreak
Table 2
Best practices in neonatal outbreak investigation for low- and middle-income countries.
1. Identify an outbreak or potential outbreak as early as possible (early identiﬁcation is made possible by means of routine surveillance) and alert IPC staff, clinicians, and
microbiologists who communicate with each other on a continual basis.
2. Take prompt action to identify all cases and contacts. Create a case deﬁnition to identify cases and amend the deﬁnition as the investigation into the outbreak
progresses. Clearly deﬁne who can be regarded as contacts and base this decision on a high (substantial) risk of exposure to the case(s). Keep track of all the contacts
from as early as possible. Write down all the relevant details. This is cumbersome but most often comes in handy later when contacts become infected.
3. Implement appropriate isolation measures immediately. This includes limited movement of cases and contacts and closure of affected rooms for new admissions.
Elevated (stricter and more extensive) isolation precautions over and above precautions that are usually put in place for a single isolation case are often required and are
usually effective in outbreak control. Cohort cases and contacts. Ensure that the appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) and other supplies are available. Keep
the minimum of supplies inside isolation rooms; e.g. one box of gloves per crib only.
4. Review isolation measures on a daily basis with the staff on duty. Include the night shift staff as well as the housekeeping and administrative staff. Give feedback about
progress being made with the outbreak and emphasize the need for continued isolation precautions to keep staff motivated. Also explain the isolation measures to
parents/caregivers and make sure they understand what is expected of them.
5. Draft a protocol to give guidance for the management of the outbreak. The protocols must be short (one page), easy to read, and must contain speciﬁc actions to be
taken. Laminate these posters and display them in the isolation rooms where they are visible.
6. Plot cases and their location, movement, and other relevant data such as dates of positive isolates on a timeline or Gantt chart. This will help to identify the index case,
possible source of the outbreak, and the clinical areas involved in the outbreak.
7. Calculate the incidence rate and plot the number of new cases on a histogram so that the progress of the outbreak can be monitored.
8. Have regular (daily if needed) meetings with hospital management, infection control, microbiology, infectious diseases, clinicians, and nursing managers to give
feedback about the progress of the outbreak, isolation measures, the situation in the affected areas, and plans to continue clinical care of neonates not part of the
outbreak. Also keep neighbouring hospitals informed. Communication is a key measure.
9. Ensure that isolation precautions are maintained when cases or contacts have to go for surgery or when cases and contacts are transferred to other healthcare facilities.
10. Monitor people entering the isolation rooms (e.g., consultants and allied health professionals such as dieticians and radiographers), since they may not be aware of the
outbreak. Make sure that they are informed and adhere to the isolation precautions.
11. Make sure that non-compliance with the isolation protocol is addressed as soon as possible and that the reason for the non-compliance is investigated.
12. Screen staff only as a last resort and when the outbreak investigation suggests that the source of the outbreak may be due to staff carriage.
13. Screen neonates to determine carrier status when dealing with outbreaks of VRE and carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae.
14. Do environmental sampling only when the outbreak investigation suggests the likelihood of environmental sources of the outbreak.
15. Use a checklist for terminal cleaning of the isolation rooms and ensure that the terminal cleaning of the rooms is supervised.
IPC, infection prevention and control; VRE, vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus.
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frequent NNU HA-BSI pathogen, i.e., implying that ‘endemic’ BSI
pathogens like Klebsiella may actually represent propagation of
several linked infection clusters/outbreaks.
Another important difference from the Tygerberg NNU experi-
ence is the absence of S. marcescens in the African NNU outbreak
literature. There is growing evidence of S. marcescens as an
important neonatal pathogen globally, with substantial associated
mortality4 and long-term neurodevelopmental morbidity docu-
mented among patients at the study institution.34 Gram-positive
organisms (VRE and MRSA) are also notably absent from the
African NNU outbreak literature, whereas they were relatively
common outbreak pathogens at Tygerberg, albeit with low
mortality. Furthermore, all reports of viral pathogen outbreaks
came from South Africa, possibly reﬂecting easier access to
virology laboratory services. Although there was no obvious
inﬂuence of seasonality for bacterial outbreaks, the viruses causing
outbreaks (rotavirus and inﬂuenza virus) occurred during the usual
southern hemisphere peak transmission seasons for each patho-
gen.
Outbreak-associated mortality at Tygerberg was substantially
lower than the mortality at the other African NNUs (7% vs. 34%),
and even lower than mortality reported from high-income
countries in a recent systematic review (9%). The availability of
NICU facilities, an excellent laboratory, and IP service, as well as
access to broad-spectrum antibiotics (particularly carbapenems),
were probably important factors in containing outbreak size and
limiting mortality at the study institution.
In the 20 African NNU outbreak reports included in this review,
many supplied very limited information on the IP measures
implemented. Future outbreak reports should include detailed
descriptions of interventions utilized, to expand the knowledge of
control strategies and their success in low-resource settings. In
addition, increased reporting of African NNU outbreaks will
provide clearer estimates of the continent’s outbreak burden
and pathogen spectrum. Additional data on the epidemiology of
HA-BSI in African NNUs is also urgently required to inform empiricantibiotic neonatal regimens. Strengthening of laboratory services
and the ability to conduct HAI surveillance in Africa will support
both a better understanding of epidemiology and ability to
investigate/report outbreaks. In particular, increased access to
molecular typing services in African laboratories would be
particularly helpful to integrate epidemiological and clonality
data during the investigation and control of neonatal outbreaks.
The value of detailed outbreak investigation, institutional
preparedness, and support of clinician leaders and hospital
management in enforcing IP measures, cannot be overstated.
Outbreaks on the NNU and especially in the NICU, always present a
crisis because they affect bed availability. In most low-resource
settings, ward closure during outbreaks is seldom implemented, as
diversion of neonatal admissions is often not possible. Given this
reality, cohort nursing and ‘isolation’ in incubators (as a physical
barrier) are practical measures for outbreak management in
African NNUs. Dealing with an NNU outbreak is a complex process
with multifactorial challenges to address, in addition to standard
measures of case, contact, and source identiﬁcation and the
implementation of transmission-based precautions. These chal-
lenges include the high number of ‘contacts’ as a result of constant
movement of babies across the NNU platform; pressure to
continue service delivery while containing the outbreak; insufﬁ-
cient isolation space; staff shortages preventing the dedicated
allocation of staff to nurse infected/colonized babies; insufﬁcient
equipment to allow for dedicated use; difﬁculty in ensuring
adequate disinfection of shared items; and staff fatigue with
protocols and personal protective equipment (PPE) recommenda-
tions. Notwithstanding these challenges, in the authors’ experi-
ence most outbreaks have been terminated by a combination of
increased hand hygiene compliance rates, strict adherence to
precautions, cohort isolation, enhanced environmental cleaning,
and staff education.
In conclusion, outbreaks in hospitalized African neonates are
frequent but under-reported, with high mortality and a predomi-
nance of Gram-negative bacteria. Breaches in IP practice are
commonly implicated and the outbreak source is conﬁrmed in less
Table 3
Published outbreaks affecting hospitalized African neonates (January 1, 1996 to January 1, 2016).
First author Outbreak
year/s
Country Setting Pathogen Casesa
(n)
Deaths
(n)
Presumed or conﬁrmed
outbreak source
IP measures for outbreak control
Ben-Hamouda15 1996 Tunisia Ward Klebsiella pneumoniae
ESBL
40 NR Ward environment NR
Newman16 1996 Ghana NICU Salmonella group G 6 0 Mattresses/radiant warmer WC
Cotton17 1996 S. Africa Ward Klebsiella pneumoniae
ESBL
32 15 Cockroaches in vinyl wall
covering
WC, HH, removal of vinyl wall
coverings, fumigation, patient
screening
Pillay18 1996 S. Africa Ward Klebsiella pneumoniae
ESBL
33 13 Unknown WC, HH, patient isolation,
enhanced environmental
cleaning
Pillay19 1997 S. Africa NICU Acinetobacter
baumannii (MDR)
9 2 Suction catheters and bottles WC, HH, single-use catheters
for suctioning
van Nierop20 1998 S. Africa NICU Enterobacter cloacae 12 9 Intravenous infusions, hands of
staff
HH, discarded all intravenous
solutions
Gregersen21 1998 S. Africa NICU Klebsiella pneumoniae
ESBL
6 2 Unknown HH
Jeena22 1999 S. Africa NICU Acinetobacter
baumannii (MDR)
5 NR Presumed environmental
source
WC, HH, cohort isolation,
patient screening
Moore23 2001 Egypt NICU Predominantly
Klebsiella pneumoniae
ESBL
88 (R),
24 (P)
59 (R) Intravenous glucose
preparations
Reviewed aseptic preparation
of intravenous ﬂuids, HH
Bouallègue-Godet24 2002 Tunisia NN unit Salmonella enterica
serotype Livingstone
ESBL
16 2 Not identiﬁed, possible
environmental
HH, patient isolation, enhanced
environmental cleaning
Boukadida25 2002 Tunisia NICU Klebsiella pneumoniae
ESBL
14 14 Contamination of intravenous
infusions, poor hand hygiene
NR
Marais26 2002/3
2004
S. Africa NN unit Klebsiella pneumoniae
ESBL
17
10
9
6
Intravenous supplements Aseptic preparation of
intravenous ﬂuids, HH, general
IP measures
Moodley27 2005 S. Africa Ward Klebsiella pneumoniae
ESBL
26 22 Intravenous glucose
preparations
HH, stopped use of multi-dose
vials
Visser28 2006 S. Africa Kangaroo
Care ward
RSV 23 2 RSV identical strain identiﬁed
from child on paediatric ward
NR
Eibach29 2007–2012 Ghana Ward Klebsiella pneumoniae
ESBL (4 clusters)
20 NR NR NR
Holgate14 2009 S. Africa NN unit H1N1 inﬂuenza 5 1 Infected staff and patients Cohort isolation
de Villiers30 2010 S. Africa NN unit Rotavirus 44 9 Proportion of community-
acquired vs. nosocomial
disease NR
NR
Mshana31 2010 Tanzania Ward Enterobacter cloacae
ESBL
17 6 Contaminated milk bucket HH, enhanced environmental
cleaning
Mshana32 2010 Tanzania NN unit Klebsiella pneumoniae
ESBL (3 clusters)
28
26
6
Possible common source,
colonized staff
NR
ProMed Mail33 2010 S. Africa Ward Norovirus 17 6 Suspected infected mother or
staff member
NR
ESBL, extended-spectrum b-lactamase producer; HH, hand hygiene; IP, infection prevention; MDR, multidrug-resistant; NICU, neonatal intensive care unit; NN unit, neonatal
unit admitting inborn and outborn babies <4 weeks of age; NR, not reported; P, prospective; R, retrospective; RSV, respiratory syncytial virus; S. Africa, South Africa; WC, ward
closure.
a Cases = infected neonates (excludes colonized babies).
84 A. Dramowski et al. / International Journal of Infectious Diseases 57 (2017) 79–85than 50% of cases. Programmes to improve outbreak surveillance/
reporting and address lapses in IP in African NNUs are urgently
required.
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